Aboriginal Rights in Transition: Reassessing Aboriginal Title and Governance by McNeil, Kent
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2001
Aboriginal Rights in Transition: Reassessing
Aboriginal Title and Governance
Kent McNeil
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, kmcneil@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
McNeil, Kent. "Aboriginal Rights in Transition: Reassessing Aboriginal Title and Governance." American Review of Canadian Studies
31.1/2 (2001): 317-329.
 Aboriginal Rights in Transition: 
Reassessing Aboriginal Title and 
Governance 
 
KENT McNEIL  
 
In the past five years, there have been some very significant political and 
legal developments in relation to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. On 1 April 
1999,Nunavut emerged as a new territory in the central Arctic, under the de facto 
control of the Inuit residents who comprise about 85 percent of the population. 
The previous August, the Nisga'a Agreement was initialed in British Columbia 
after almost twenty-five years of negotiations. This is the first modem land-
claims agreement to be signed in a province where most of the land is claimed by 
Aboriginal peoples by virtue of their Aboriginal title. On 7 January 1998, the 
Canadian government announced a new policy of reconciliation with the 
Aboriginal peoples, aimed at strengthening Aboriginal governance and economic 
development, and healing some of the wounds caused by the tragic legacy of the 
residential school system. This policy initiative was in partial response to the 
massive five-volume Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
released in the fall of 1996, that condemned Canada for its past treatment of the 
Aboriginal peoples and recommended a fundamental restructuring of the 
relationship based on principles of mutual recognition, respect, sharing, and 
responsibility. 
These political arrangements and policy initiatives have been matched by 
equally dramatic developments in the law of Aboriginal rights by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. In a series of important decisions, the Court has come to 
 grips with a number of issues that it did its best to avoid in the past, involving 
the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights, the content of 
Aboriginal title to land and the requirements for proving it, and the 
relevance of the law of New France to Aboriginal rights today. This paper will 
focus on these recent developments in the law, as well as attempting to 
identify areas where the law of Aboriginal rights is incomplete and so 
requires further judicial elucidation.  
 
Constitutionalization of Aboriginal Rights and the "Integral to the 
Distinctive Culture" Test 
 
Prior to three decisions released by the Supreme Court in August of 
1996, which are collectively known as the Van der Peet trilogy, there were no 
clear legal guidelines for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights. Those 
rights were generally known to arise from the precolonial presence of 
Aboriginal societies in Canada and their occupation of lands but, prior to 
1996, the Court had not laid down any rules for determining which 
practices and traditions qualified for protection as Aboriginal rights and 
which did not. This matter became particularly important when Aboriginal 
rights were accorded constitutional protection (along with treaty rights, 
which will not be discussed in this paper) at the same time as the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced in 1982. This protection was 
provided by section 35( I ) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that 
"The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
 Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."1 The intention was to identify 
and define Aboriginal rights by political means and, possibly, by further 
constitutional amendment. But even though four constitutional conferences 
were held in the 1980s to accomplish this task, the talks foundered over the 
issue of Aboriginal self-government. As a result, identification and 
definition of Aboriginal rights were relegated to the legal forum of the courts 
by default.2 
The Supreme Court first considered the effect of the 
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in the Sparrow case, decided in 
1990.3 In that case the right in question-the right of the Musqueam 
Nation in British Columbia to fish for food, societal, and ceremonial 
purposes-was accepted by the Court without the need to formulate a test 
for identification of Aboriginal rights generally. The Court focused instead 
on the issues of extinguishment and infringement of Aboriginal rights, 
holding that the rights constitutionalized in 1982 are those that were 
"existing" in the sense that they had not previously been extinguished by 
clear and plain legislation or treaty. The Court nonetheless decided that the 
constitutional protection provided in 1982 is not absolute-Aboriginal rights 
can still be infringed by legislation if the government can establish a valid 
legislative objective for the infringement that is substantial and compelling, 
and show that the government's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people 
in question have been respected by consulting with them, infringing their 
rights as little as possible in the circumstances, and paying them 
compensation for any expropriation. This has become known as the Sparrow 
 justification test. 
As Sparrow left open the issue of how Aboriginal rights are to be identified 
and defined, the Supreme Court was obliged to return to this question in 1996 
in the Vander Peet, Gl.adstone, and N.T.C. Smokehouse cases (the Vander Peet 
trilogy)." We will focus our discussion on the Van der Peet case, as it laid down 
the test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights that was applied in the 
other two decisions. That case involved charges laid against Dorothy Van 
der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo Nation in British Columbia, for unlawfully 
selling ten salmon that had been caught under the authority of an Indian food 
fish license. In defense, she claimed an Aboriginal right to sell fish. 
The Chief Justice of Canada at the time, Antonio Lamer, wrote the 
majority judgment. In it, he created a test for identifying and defining 
Aboriginal rights that is commonly referred to as the "integral to the 
distinctive culture" test. In Lamer's words, "in order to be an aboriginal right 
an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to 
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right."5 Moreover, 
the time for determining whether a practice, custom, or tradition meets this 
test is the time prior to contact between the Aboriginal people in question and 
the European colonizers. Practices, customs, and traditions that arose as a 
result of contact do not qualify, as in Lamer's view they are not 
"aboriginal." In the case at hand, although the Sto:lo had traded with other 
Aboriginal nations and exchanged fish for other goods prior to European 
contact, Lamer found that exchange of salmon for money or other goods 
had not been an integral part of their distinctive culture. Dorothy Van der 
 Peet therefore did not have an Aboriginal right to sell salmon, even in small 
quantities, as exchange of salmon had not been a defining feature of pre-
contact Sto:lo society. Instead, it was incidental to the more primary activity 
of fishing for food and ceremonial purposes, and so was not sufficiently 
integral to their distinctive culture to be protected as an Aboriginal right. 
Lamer's narrow, time-orientated approach to the identification and definition 
of Aboriginal rights has been severely criticized. The two women on the 
Supreme Court at the time, Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dube, both 
wrote strong dissenting judgments. While accepting Lamer's statement of the 
appropriate test quoted above, McLachlin disagreed with the meaning he 
attached to "integral." For her, a practice is integral to an Aboriginal culture 
if it "is part of the unity of practices which together make up that culture. 
This suggests a very broad definition: anything which can be said to be part of 
the aboriginal culture would qualify as an aboriginal right protected by the 
Constitution Act, 1982."6 She also thought that Lamer's approach was too 
categorical, leading to an all-or-nothing result, and incorporated 
indeterminate subjective elements in identifying what is distinctive and 
central to a culture. She preferred an "empirical historic approach" that would 
allow judges to identify Aboriginal rights by asking: "ls this like the sort of 
thing which the law has recognized [as an Aboriginal right] in the past ?"7 Her 
goals seem to have been to avoid rigidity, and to ensure that Aboriginal 
peoples, in keeping with their traditions and cultures, continue to have 
access to the resources necessary to sustain their distinctive societies. In 
keeping with these goals, she also rejected Lamer's  pre-contact time frame 
 for identifying Aboriginal rights, suggesting instead that they should be 
based on traditional Aboriginal laws and customs whose roots, while historical, 
need not be traced to pre-contact times. 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube was even more forceful in her dissent in Van der 
Peet. She characterized Chief Justice Lamer's precontact requirement as a 
"frozen right" approach that is inconsistent with Aboriginal perspectives, 
arbitrary, and unfair because it places an overly onerous burden of proof on 
the Aboriginal peoples. She preferred a "dynamic right" approach that would 
allow for the evolution of Aboriginal rights over time so they would "maintain 
contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their 
practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in 
which they live."8 As long as a practice, custom, or tradition was sufficiently 
fundamental to the Aboriginal culture in question ''for a substantial continuous 
period of time"-which she suggested could range from twenty to fifty years-it would 
qualify for protection as an Aboriginal right.9 L'Heureux-Dube also criticized 
Lamer's narrow approach to the definition of Aboriginal rights. Instead of 
focusing on particular Aboriginal practices, traditions, and customs, as he did, she 
favored a generic approach that would define Aboriginal rights in a more general 
and abstract way. She wrote: "the aboriginal practices, traditions arid customs 
which form the core of the lives of native people and which provide them with a 
way and means of living as an organized society will fall within the scope of the 
constitutional protection under s.35(1)."10 Moreover, she viewed section 35(1) 
more broadly as protecting the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples 
rather than particular activities that are "manifestations" of those cultures: 
 "Simply put, the emphasis would be on the significance of these activities to natives 
rather than on the activities themselves." 11 
It was unclear from the Van der Peet decision whether Lamer's "integral to 
the distinctive culture" test would be applied to Aboriginal title to land. 
Commentators feared that it would, as the ChiefJustice had written in his 
majority judgment that "aboriginal title is the aspect of aboriginal rights 
related specifically to aboriginal claims to land."12 Six weeks later, in the 
Adams and Core decisions from Quebec, he elaborated on this connection 
between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights by holding that Aboriginal 
rights, such as the fishing rights at issue in those cases, can exist independently 
of Aboriginal title. 13 While those rights may be site-specific, they do not 
require the occupation and degree of use of land that is necessary to establish a 
claim to Aboriginal title. 
The Adams and Cote decisions are significant for another reason as well. In 
both cases, Quebec argued that Aboriginal title to land could not exist in the 
province because the French law that had been in place before the conquest 
of New France by Britain in 1759-60 did not recognize Aboriginal land rights. 
Chief Justice Lamer refused to accept this argument. Even if the province's 
interpretation of precoriquest French law was correct (which Lamer found to 
be a matter of some doubt), he was unwilling to make the existence of 
Aboriginal title in various parts of Canada dependent upon which European 
power-France or Britain-happened to colonize an area first. If Quebec's 
argument were adopted, he said, it "would create an awkward patchwork of 
constitutional protection for aboriginal rights across the nation, depending 
 upon the historical idiosyncracies of colonization over particular regions of the 
country."14 He also found that it would risk "undermining the very purpose of 
section 35( 1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples 
at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of 
preexisting Aboriginal societies."15 In this important respect, Adams and Core 
affirmed an earlier Supreme Court decision that the law of Aboriginal title is 
part of the federal common law that applies throughout the country.16 
While the Adams and Cote decisions indicated that the Supreme Court 
saw important distinctions between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal 
rights, the relevance of the Vander Peet approach to Aboriginal title remained 
uncertain. It was not at all clear whether the Court would apply the integral 
to the distinctive culture test in defining Aboriginal title. Resolution of this 
important issue had to await the Delgamuukw decision, handed down in 
December of 1997.  
 
Defining and Proving Aboriginal Title to Land 
 
The significance of Aboriginal title in Canada cannot be overestimated. 
Unlike in the United States, where most Indian lands were acquired by 
conquest or treaty during the course of colonization and westward 
expansion, in Canada conquest of the Aboriginal nations did not occur, 
and treaties involving land were limited for the most part to Ontario, the 
Prairie provinces, part of the Northwest Territories, and smaller 
portions of British Columbia. As a result, when Aboriginal title to land 
 was accepted as a legal right by the Supreme Court in the Calder case in 
1973, over half the country was still subject to Aboriginal title claims. 17 
Since then, some of these claims have been dealt with by modern land, 
claims agreements, most recently by the Nunavut, Yukon, and Nisga'a 
agreements. But large areas-particularly in the Atlantic Provinces, 
Quebec, and British Columbia remain subject to these claims. In those 
areas in particular, Aboriginal title has very significant implications for 
land ownership and resource development. 
The issue of the content of Aboriginal title came squarely before the 
Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw case.18 That case involved claims by the 
Gitksan (also spelled Gitsan) and Wet'suwet'en nations in north, western 
British Columbia to ownership and jurisdiction over their traditional 
territories, an area almost as large as New Brunswick. The trial was the 
longest and most complex in Canadian history: it involved seventy, six 
witnesses, fifty three affidavits, and 9,200 documents, and took 374 days of 
court time. In a four hundred page judgment, Chief J ustice McEachem of 
the British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed the claims, but that decision 
was appealed up to the Supreme Court of Canada, which reversed the judgment 
and ordered a new trial, in part because McEachem had not dealt with the oral 
histories of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en in an appropriate way by according 
them the same kind of respect and weight that courts accord to written 
histories. 
While not coming to any -Oecision on the merits of the case, the 
Supreme Court did lay down a number of principles to guide trial judges in 
 Aboriginal title cases. In addition to providing more scope for the use of oral 
histories, the Court defined Aboriginal title, explained what is necessary 
to prove it, clarified the extent of federal authority over it, and addressed the 
issues of constitutional protection and infringement. Apart from the use of 
oral histories, we will discuss each of these matters in tum, paying particular 
attention to the Court's definition of Aboriginal title. Although the Court 
declined to deal with the claim to jurisdiction, which it characterized as a 
claim to self-government, we will nonetheless address this matter as well in 
the next section of this paper. 
Prior to the Delgamuukw decision, there was disagreement over whether 
Aboriginal title is equivalent to ownership of land and thus includes natural 
resources such as timber and minerals, or is limited to the uses the particular 
Aboriginal nation made of the land in the past. Relying on the Vander Peet 
decision, the governments of Canada and British Columbia argued in 
Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title is limited to those past uses that meet the 
test of being "integral to the distinctive culture" of the claimants. The 
Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, on the other hand, argued that Aboriginal title, 
although inalienable except by surrender to the Crown, is otherwise 
tantamount to fee simple ownership. Chief Justice Lamer, who wrote the 
principal judgment, did not accept either of these positions. In addition to 
being inalienable, he found that Aboriginal title differs from fee simple 
ownership in a number of significant respects. First, it has its source in 
occupation of land prior to assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown, 
whereas fee simple title arises afterwards. Secondly, Aboriginal title has an 
 inherent limit that prevents the land from being used in ways that are 
inconsistent with the attachment to the land that gave rise to it in the first 
place. Finally, Aboriginal title is a collective right that is held communally by 
all the members of an Aboriginal nation. Because of these distinctive 
features, Aboriginal title is unlike any other common law property· interest-it 
is sui generis. 
Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless came down on the side of the Gitksan 
and Wet'suwet'en on the vital issue of natural resources. Despite Aboriginal 
title's special features, he said that it is "the right to the land itself," which 
"encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held 
pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of 
those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to 
distinctive aboriginal cultures."19 He went on to hold specifically that 
Aboriginal title includes minerals, oil, and gas, even though exploitation of 
those resources might not have been a traditional use of the land. So the 
Vander Peet test does not apply to restrict the uses Aboriginal peoples may 
make of their lands, though Lamer did say that the connection with the land 
upon which Aboriginal title is based has to be "of central significance to their 
distinctive culture".20 He hastened to add, however, that this need not be an 
explicit element of the test for Aboriginal title, as occupation of land and 
maintenance of a substantial connection with it would be sufficient in and of 
themselves to show that an Aboriginal nation's relationship with the land was 
integral to its distinctive culture. 
This brings us to the matter of proof of Aboriginal title. Lamer said that 
 Aboriginal title can be established by proof that the Aboriginal people in 
question were in exclusive occupation of the claimed lands at the time of 
Crown assertion of sovereignty. Exclusive occupation is required, he said, 
because the Aboriginal title it gives rise to is exclusive. However, he also 
envisaged joint Aboriginal title where two or more Aboriginal nations shared 
exclusive occupation. Lamer chose assertion of sovereignty rather than contact 
as the appropriate time for proving the requisite occupation because that is 
when Aboriginal title "arises out of prior occupation of land by the aboriginal 
peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and pre-existing 
systems of aboriginal law."21 It is a burden on the underlying title to land that 
the Crown acquires along with sovereignty, and so cannot predate sovereignty. 
In this respect, he distinguished Aboriginal title from other Aboriginal rights, 
which as we have seen must have pre-contact origins, because Aboriginal title 
depends simply on occupation of land, and so "does not raise the problem of 
distinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and 
traditions and those influenced or introduced by European contact."22 Also, he 
found the date of sovereignty to be more certain. 
Though Lamer spoke of Crown "assertion" of sovereignty, he must have 
meant "acquisition," as that is when the Crown's underlying title to lands 
would vest. But it is unclear whether he intended to limit this to acquisition 
of sovereignty by the British Crown, or meant to include the French Crown 
as well. In parts of Eastern Canada, the difference between these two dates 
could be as much as 150 years, during which time considerable movement of 
Aboriginal populations, and hence changes in occupation of lands, took 
 place. Also, in many areas of Canada the date of acquisition of European 
sovereignty is at least as uncertain as the date of contact, as sovereignty 
involves" murky legal questions as well as factual ones. Even more 
fundamentally, it might be asked why the onus is on Aboriginal peoples to 
prove their own title as against the European colonizers when we all know 
that they were here occupying lands when the newcomers arrived. 
In addition to defining Aboriginal title and explaining how it can be 
proven, in Delgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer resolved an important issue 
concerning the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments. Under Canada's original 1867 Constitution, the federal 
government was given exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands 
reserved for the lndians."23 However, it was unclear whether "Lands 
reserved" included Aboriginal title lands, or were limited to lands expressly 
reserved under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, treaties, or statutes such as 
the Indian Act. In Delgamuukw Lamer clarified this by deciding that 
Aboriginal title lands are indeed encompassed by the words "Lands 
reserved for the Indians." But he went even further by ruling that all 
Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, are within the very core of this 
federal jurisdiction, which means that they are insulated from provincial laws 
by the constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.24 As a result, 
Lamer held that ever since Confederation the provinces have lacked the 
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title. 
We have seen that Lamer described Aboriginal title as "the right to the land 
itself ' and "the right to exclusive use and occupation."25 These descriptive 
 phrases clearly reveal that, despite its sui generis features, Aboriginal title is 
proprietary in nature. It therefore should be entitled to all the protection that 
English law, going back at least to Magna Carta in 1215, has traditionally 
accorded to property rights. Moreover, unlike other property rights in 
Canada, Aboriginal title is also constitutionally protected as an Aboriginal 
right by section 35( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. But despite these 
protections, when Lamer addressed the issue of infringement of Aboriginal 
title in Delgamuukw he reached the startling conclusion that Aboriginal title 
may be justifiably infringed for a variety of purposes, including "the 
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the 
general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, 
protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of 
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those 
aims."26 Most of these purposes fall within provincial jurisdiction, against 
which exclusive federal jurisdiction and the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, as we have seen, should protect Aboriginal title from infringement. 
But there is an even more fundamental reason to be disturbed by Lamer's list 
of justifiable purposes. The development of agriculture, forestry, and mining, 
for example, require not just government regulation of Aboriginal title lands, 
but a taking of those lands (or at least of the resources on or under them). As 
this looks more like expropriation than infringement, one is left wondering 
how this kind of treatment of the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples can be justified, especially if the governments doing the taking (the 
provinces) have no jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. Moreover, as the Chief 
 Justice probably did not have in mind publicly owned farms, forestry 
operations, and mines in this context, he must have envisaged the taking of 
Aboriginal lands for private as well as public purposes. Government taking 
of constitutionally protected property rights for the benefit of private 
interests is a violation of fundamental principles. 
Lamer nonetheless tempered this governmental power over Aboriginal 
title lands by holding that consultation with the Aboriginal peoples affected 
has to take place before their rights are infringed. The degree of consultation 
depends on the extent of the infringement, and can amount to a need for 
outright consent where the infringement is especially serious. Also, as he 
said the government will ordinarily have to pay fair compensation, 
infringement is not cost free. As the compensation payable may outweigh the 
value of the infringement to the government, this last requirement might act 
as an effective practical impediment to widespread government interference 
with Aboriginal title. 
In addition to Aboriginal title, the Delgamuukw case involved a claim by 
the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en to jurisdiction, or a right of self-government, 
over their territories. As mentioned above, Chief J ustice Lamer declined to 
deal with this issue. He said: "The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and 
the resultant need for a new trial, make it impossible for this Court to 
determine whether the claim to self-government has been made out. 
Moreover, this is not the right case for the Court to lay down the legal 
principles to guide further litigation."27 However, in my view a right of self-
government is nonetheless implicit in the Delgamuukw decision. The next 
 section of this paper will examine this issue.  
 
An Aboriginal Right of Self-Government 
 
So far the Supreme Court has dealt directly with a self-government claim only 
once, in the Pamajewon decision.28 That case involved a claim by the 
Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations in Ontario that they have a right of 
self-government over their reserves that includes the right to regulate high-
stakes gambling. Delivering the principal judgment, Chief J ustice Lamer 
assumed, without deciding, that the Aboriginal rights protected by section 35( 
1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 include a right of self-government, but held 
that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations had not established an 
Aboriginal right to engage in or regulate gambling. Applying the Van der 
Peet integral to the distinctive culture test, he found that, although the Ojibwa 
ancestors of these First Nations had gambled, that activity was not of 
central significance to their societies. Moreover, there was no evidence that 
they had regulated gambling. So their claim to self-government failed on the 
facts. The Pamajewon decision nonetheless left the door open for Aboriginal 
peoples to prove a right of self-government over activities that were integral 
to their distinctive cultures, if they could also establish that they had 
regulated those activities prior to European contact. 
The Pamajewon decision has been criticized for, among other things, 
taking a narrow, fragmented approach to Aboriginal self-government. The 
Chief Justice refused to characterize the claim as being to "a broad right to 
 manage the use of their reserve lands," as the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First 
Nations wanted the Court to do.29 That, Lamer said, would "cast the Court's 
inquiry at a level of excessive generality."30 He demanded greater specificity, 
thereby obliging Aboriginal peoples to prove their right of self-government on 
a piecemeal basis, activity by activity. Any possibility of establishing a broad 
right of self-government over their lands and peoples appeared to have been 
foreclosed by this decision. 
Sixteen months later, the Supreme Court decided Delgamuukw. As we have 
seen, it declined to deal with self-government then. But Chief J ustice Lamer 
did make a very significant statement that has been taken to imply a right of 
self-government over Aboriginal title lands. After observing that Aboriginal 
title is held communally as "a collective right to land held by all members of 
an aboriginal nation," he said this: "Decisions with respect to that land are also 
made by that community."31 Now it is difficult to imagine how a community 
can make decisions about their land without some form of political organization 
that provides the means for collective decision-making. The communal nature 
of Aboriginal title, in and of itself, therefore seems to necessitate self-
government. 32 Moreover, as other Aboriginal rights, such as hunting and 
fishing rights, are generally just as communal as Aboriginal title, the same 
analysis should apply to them as well. So instead of attempting to prove a 
right of self-government directly, Aboriginal peoples may have more success 
establishing other Aboriginal rights first, and then asserting that a right of 
self-government is entailed by the communal nature of those rights.  
 
 Conclusions 
 
The beginning of the twenty-first century shows a lot of promise for the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Advances made by them in the political 
arena, starting with the entrenchment of their Aboriginal and treaty rights in the 
Constitution in 1982, have been matched by some solid victories in Canada's 
highest court. In what is undoubtedly its most signifi- cant Aboriginal-rights 
decision to date, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw finally recognized that 
Aboriginal title to land includes a right to exclusive use and occupation that 
encompasses natural resources. Given the extent of unsettled Aboriginal title 
claims, especially in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia, 
the economic and political implications of this ruling are enormous. The 
issue of Aboriginal self-government has also been simmering ever since the 
constitutional conferences of the 1980s, but outside of agreements such as those 
reached with the Inuit of Nunavut and the Nisga'a in British Columbia, it 
remains unresolved. Given, however, that a right of self-government 
probably underlies every other Aboriginal right, acknowledgement of its 
existence by the Supreme Court cannot be far off.  
  
 NOTES 
1. Note that, in principle if not in practice, the constitutional protection provided by section 
35( 1) makes Aboriginal rights in Canada more secure than Indian rights in the United States, as the 
latter are not constitutionally protected and so are subject to the plenary power of Congress. 
 
2. See Kent McNeil, "The Decolonization of Canada: Moving Toward Recogni- tion of 
Aboriginal Governments," Western Legal History 7 (1994): 113-141. 
 
3. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] l S.C.R. 1075. 
 
4. R. v. Vander Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. 
v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672. 
 
5. R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 4, para. 46. 
 
6. Ibid., para. 256. 
 
7. Ibid., para. 261 (emphasis in original). 
 
8. Ibid., para. 172. 
 
9. Ibid., para. 175 (emphasis in original). 
 
10. Ibid., para. 161. 
 
11. !hid., para. 157 (emphasis in original). 
 
12. Ibid., para. 33. 
 
13. R. v. Adams, (1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Cote, (1996] 3 S.C.R. 139. 
 
14. R. v. C6te, supra note 13, para. 53. 
 
15. Ibid. 
 
16. Roberts v. Canada, [1989] l S.C.R. 322. 
 
17. Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, (1973) S.C.R. 313. 
 
18. Delgamuukw t1. British Columbia, [1997) 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
 
19. !hid., para. 117, 140. 
 
20. !hid., para. 150, quoting from R. v. Adams, supra note 13, para. 26. 
 
21. Delgamuukw ti. British Columbia, supra note 18, para. 145. 
 
22. Ibid. 
 
23. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet. (U.K.), c.3, s.91(24). 
 
24. Where it applies, this llnctrine excludes the possibility of concurrent provin- cial 
jurisdiction. So where Aboriginal rights are concerned, it should prevent provincial laws of 
general application from affecting those rights. 
 
25. See text accompanying note 19, supra. 
 
 26. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 18, pra. 165. 
 
27. !hid., para. 170. 
 
28. R. v. Pamajewon, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 164. 
 
29. Ibid., para. 27. 
 
30. lhid. 
 
31. Delgamuukw ti. British Columbia, supra note 18, para. 115. 
 
32. For recent judicial acceptance of this argument, see Campbell v. British Columbia, 
[2000) 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.). 
 
